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Abstract
Background: Porcine epidemic diarrhea virus (PEDV) has never been reported in Denmark, but it has been found
in Europe, Asia and North America. Ultimately, PEDV has been associated with devastating outbreaks in pig farms.
We developed a stochastic simulation model to carry out a quantitative risk assessment and to estimate the annual
probability (PPlasma) of introducing PEDV into the Danish pig population, by imported spray-dried porcine plasma
(SDPP). The model was based on information from literature and Danish feed companies. Moreover testing the
batch of raw blood (before the spray-drying) was considered as potential risk mitigation measure in the future.
Results: The median PPlasma was 0.2 % (90 % P.I.: 0.003 %; 2.6 %). Hence, the annual probability of introducing PEDV
into the Danish pig population by imported SDPP appeared very low, and on average at least one introduction each
500 years – corresponding to 1/0.002 - could be expected. However, if PEDV survived the spray-drying process and
storage was insufficient to completely remove the remaining viable virus (e.g. due to storage at low environmental
temperatures during a short time period) the PPlasma was 4.7 % (0.06 %; 57.4 %). In that case, on average, at least one
PEDV introduction each 21 years could be expected. This probability could be reduced to 0.3 % (0.004 %; 6.0 %) if the
raw batch of blood could be tested before drying (corresponding to at least one introduction each 333 years on
average).
Conclusions: This study provides preliminary and important information on the probability of introducing
PEDV into the Danish pig population by use of SDPP. Currently PED is not a notifiable disease in the EU and
uncertainty was present in our estimates due to possible underreporting in EU Member States, from which
SDPP is imported into Denmark. In the future, PED might become a notifiable disease, and in such a case,
new knowledge could become available on its epidemiology. Moreover, SDPP could be imported more safely if:
producers find a way to substantiate freedom from disease (at least) in herds delivering blood for SDPP, the batch of
blood tests negative for PEDV and conditions for processing/storage required by the international laws are respected.
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Background
Porcine epidemic diarrhea (PED) is a pig disease
caused by an RNA virus (PEDV), which belongs to
the Alphacoronavirus genus of the Coronaviridae
Family [1–4]. PEDV was first reported in the 1970s in
the UK [3, 5] and it has since then been found in
some EU Member States, parts of Asia and in the
Americas. The outbreaks observed in the 1970s [6],
were not as devastating in suckling pigs as those seen
today. For detailed reviews on the pathogenesis and
epidemiology of the disease, and its distribution
worldwide we refer to Song and Park [2], EFSA [3]
and Martelli et al. [7].
Domestic pigs are the only known hosts and the oc-
currence of the disease in other animal species is un-
known [3]. PED can be considered a re-emerging
disease though it is currently not included in the OIE
List of Diseases and is not a notifiable disease in the
EU [3]. Nevertheless, there has been an increase in
the disease notifications to the OIE’s World Animal
Health Information System [4].
In Europe, in the 1990s, serological surveys made in
different Member States showed a low prevalence of the
virus. During the last decade a few recent outbreaks
have been reported from the EU (e.g. in Italy, Germany,
Belgium, The Netherlands and Ukraine) [3, 7, 8].
The PED virus strains seen today affect pigs of
any age, but most severely piglets, in which morbidity
and mortality can be as high as 100 % [4]. In
finishers, boars and sows, morbidity could be as
high as 90–100 %, while mortality ranges from 0 to
4 % [3, 4, 7, 9].
Direct transmission occurs mainly by the oral route,
e.g. through ingestion of feed contaminated with the
virus [10, 11]. Indirect transmission could occur
through fomites e.g. contaminated trucks and equip-
ment [3, 12].
Pig blood products, such as spray-dried porcine
plasma (SDPP), which can be fed to piglets as a feed
supplement, have been suspected as a possible route
of virus spread [3, 11]. However, some studies sug-
gested that SDPP is not a likely source of infectious
virus [13, 14]. In fact, for the spray-drying process
(Fig. 1), efficient combinations of temperature and
time should be used. Usually the temperature is ≥
80 °C throughout the substance and the plasma tran-
sit time in the dryer is between 20 and 90 s [15–20].
Nevertheless, it would be helpful to clarify exactly
Fig. 1 SDPP producing diagram. N.B. Here we give a general diagram, and as stated by Sampedro et al. [20], there are several parameters that
could vary between spray dryers (e.g. the flow rate inputs, the retention time etc.). Those parameters could affect the survivability of PEDV during
the spray-drying process [3, 20]
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which combinations of temperature and time are
needed to inactivate PEDV.
The incubation period of the disease is between 1
and 4 days. The infectious period can last between 1
and 5 weeks [4, 21, 22], and growing pigs can recover
within 1 or 2 weeks. Maternal antibodies can protect
piglets and re-infection might occur after immunity
wanes [4, 6, 7, 23].
Hence, PEDV is capable of causing large-scale out-
breaks of diarrhea within infected herds [7, 9]. From
a clinical point of view, the disease is similar to other
forms of gastroenteritis because symptoms include an-
orexia, vomiting, watery diarrhea and dehydration
followed by weight loss. The specific clinical signs de-
pend on the age of the animals. Usually, the lesions
found at autopsy include thinning of the intestines
and atrophic enteritis [3, 4, 9].
Differential diagnosis must be made with a) trans-
missible gastroenteritis (TGE) [24], which is caused
by a similar virus (TGEV) of the Coronaviridae Fam-
ily, b) bacteria (Clostridium spp., E. coli, etc.) and c)
parasites (Isospora suis, Cryptosporidium spp., nema-
todes, etc.) which can cause somewhat similar symp-
toms [4]. Samples of fresh feces, small intestine and
serum can be tested for diagnosis. The agent can be
identified by RT-PCR, ELISA, Immunohistochemistry
(IHC), and virus isolation [2, 4, 7, 11, 22, 24, 25].
Vaccines have been developed in Asian countries
[2], but they are currently not in use in Europe to
our knowledge [3] and there are no specific treat-
ments for the disease. Hence, prevention strategies
focus on biosecurity. All-in-all-out production systems
can be efficient to control PED in countries with en-
demic status [4].
PEDV has never been reported in Denmark [3, 26]
and keeping the free status of Danish pig herds is a pri-
ority. There is almost no import of live pigs into
Denmark, neither for breeding nor for slaughter. There-
fore, other ways of disease introduction are of concern.
The aim of the present study was to investigate to which
extent imported SDPP could represent a source of PEDV
infection for Danish pig herds. Thus, we assessed the
annual probability (PPlasma) of introducing PEDV into
the Danish pig population through imported SDPP. The
potential effect of testing raw blood batches before
spray-drying was considered as a potential risk mitiga-
tion measure although this would depend on the devel-
opment of a highly sensitive PCR test. Finally, sources of
uncertainty around the PPlasma estimate were identi-
fied, which can be useful for prioritization of new studies
on PEDV.
Results
Probability that a batch of blood collected during a
slaughtering day is contaminated
The median probability (PContBatch) that a batch of
blood collected at the abattoir abroad is contaminated
with PEDV, due to the slaughtering of at least one in-
fected pig, was 6.0 % (90 % Prediction Interval: 0.3 %;
22.6 %).
Annual probability of PEDV introduction into Danish pig
herds by imports of SDPP
According to the reference simulation scenario (Table 1,
I), the median annual probability (PPlasma) of introdu-
cing PEDV in at least one Danish herd (with at least one
piglet infected due to SDPP) was 0.2 % (90 % P.I.:
0.003 %; 2.6 %). Hence, the PPlasma appeared very low
and on average at least one introduction each 500 years
– corresponding to 1/0.002 - could be expected.
Output of alternative scenario analysis
In the alternative scenario analysis (Table 1), setting the
probability of incomplete removal of viable PEDV during
storage (after drying) to 100 % (Table 1, scenario II),
caused a remarkable increase in the PPlasma compared
to the reference scenario (Table 1, scenario I). In fact,
the median PPlasma increased from 0.2 % in scenario I,
to 4.7 % (90 % P.I.: 0.06 %; 57.4 %) in scenario II. In the
latter case, at least one PEDV introduction each 21 years
could be expected (1667; 2).
Doubling the number of imported SDPP rations
(Table 1, scenario III), or doubling the probability of in-
fection at the single animal level (Table 1, scenario IV),
Table 1 Alternative scenario analysis. Annual probability (PPlasma) of PEDV introduction into the Danish pig population
Simulation scenarioa 5th Percentile Median Yearsb 95th Percentile
Scenario I (reference) 0.003 % 0.2 % 500 2.6 %
Scenario II (PSurvDry = RiskUniform [(0; RiskUniform (5.5 %; 60 %)] 0.06 % 4.7 % 21 57.4 %
Scenario III (Rations* 2) 0.0055 % 0.40 % 250 5.28 %
Scenario IV (PInf* 2) 0.0056 % 0.37 % 270 5.30 %
a,PSurvDry = probability that PEDV survives to the spray drying according to Sampedro et al. [20] and assuming probability of virus survival during storage 100 %;
Rations = annual number of individual SDPP doses used in Denmark, PInf = probability that a naïve piglet fed with SDPP, where viable PEDV is present in traces,
becomes infected
bIn the column “years” we report how often at least one introduction of PEDV into the Danish pig population could be expected, according to the estimated
median PPlasma
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lead to twice as high a probability compared to scenario
I, but still the annual PPlasma appeared to be very low
(median around 0.4 %).
Effect of testing the raw batch of blood
We found that if the batch of blood collected at the ab-
attoir could be tested before the spray-drying process,
the PPlasma of scenario II (where storage is not efficient
for complete removal of all the remained viable PEDV)
would be reduced from 4.7 to 0.3 % (90 % P.I.: 0.004 %;
6.0 %). The latter would correspond to at least 1 intro-
duction each 333 years, on average.
Discussion
Annual probability of PEDV introduction into the Danish
pig population related to imported SDPP (current
situation)
Spray-dried plasma proteins are considered a high-
quality nutrient for weaning piglets and they can have
several beneficial effects on piglet’s health [27]. Never-
theless, during the recent years concern has arisen on
the probability of transmitting swine diseases such as
PED, through the use of SDPP [3, 11, 28].
The present study was carried out to assess the annual
probability of PEDV introduction into the Danish pig
population by imported SDPP, at a time with limited
knowledge about the virus. It gives important informa-
tion for farmers and risk managers. Additionally, this
work highlights the importance of the SDPP producing
and storage steps, where new studies could be prioritized
to reduce uncertainty on the estimated PPlasma (e.g.
during short storage in winter). Moreover, the developed
stochastic simulation model could be used in other
countries easily, by adjusting the herd incidence (Eq. 1,
HerdInc) in SDPP exporting countries (e.g. if SDPP is
imported from non-EU countries) and the annual num-
ber of imported SDPP rations (Eqs. 2–3, Rations).
We assumed that blood sera batches used to produce
SDPP could be contaminated with PEDV. In that case -
and based on available data - the probability of PEDV
introduction to Denmark would be higher than 0.
Nevertheless, if the storage period and the storage tem-
peratures were adequate to completely inactivate viable
PEDV from contaminated SDPP, the PPLasma appeared
to be very low. On average, it corresponded to one intro-
duction each 500 years which may be interpreted as a
negligible risk.
The input where we had the largest lack of knowledge
was the probability of infection after exposure to con-
taminated SDPP at the individual piglet level (PInf ). We
considered it adequate to account for uncertainty by set-
ting the PInf in a range of values between 0 and 1/
1,000,000; to reflect the debate whether low levels of
virus are viable for causing infection in weaning pigs fed
with SDPP [3, 11, 13, 14]. Sampedro et al. [20] estimated
that, although in rare situations (worst case scenario) vi-
able virus could remain in SDPP, even after storage.
Hence, in absence of precise data - and observation of
devastating outbreaks - we make use of the precaution-
ary principle. We find that the values used for PInf can
be considered fairly low and fairly high at the same time,
with the current knowledge we have at hand. In fact, it
seems that the probability of infection at the single ani-
mal/herd level should be very low (possibly close to 0)
[13, 14]. Nevertheless, at country-level, such a low prob-
ability may still lead to disease introduction, because
millions of rations of SDPP are used (in Denmark ap-
proximately 14.3 millions per year).
In previous experimental studies, where PInf has been
investigated with live pigs, a low number of animals have
been used e.g. [13, 14] due to obvious animal welfare
concerns and costs. Therefore, the outputs of the risk
assessment we have carried out, are difficult (if not im-
possible) to validate at the experimental level, since it is
impossible to undertake studies, where millions of pigs
are purposely fed with contaminated SDPP rations for
several years. This is in line with EFSA who suggested
that testing a large number of animals is required, to de-
tect low concentrations of infectious PEDV in SDPP, and
thus, the probability of detecting at least one infected
piglet during a bioassay would be low [3].
Hence, in the reference scenario (Table 1, I) we set the
maximum PInf = 1/1,000,000 and we used a Beta distri-
bution to take into account the uncertainty around such
a value. This may correspond to a negligible individual
risk of infection, but still higher than 0 (hence infection
seems unlikely but not impossible).
Furthermore, we assessed the probability of PEDV
introduction at national level by using the variable “Ra-
tions” in Eqs. 2–3, to estimate the PPlasma. If in the fu-
ture, the quantity of imported SDPP increases
remarkably (e.g. more than double), the model presented
in this study could be easily re-run to assess the
PPlasma with the adjusted number of Rations.
Information from alternative scenario analysis
According to the alternative scenario analysis, the input
with the highest impact on the estimated PPlasma was
the probability that any virus, which may have survived
the processing, also survives the storage. In scenario II
(Table 1), we set that probability to 100 %. Here, we
showed that if PEDV is not completely inactivated by
the spray-drying process and the storage is not effective
to eliminate all remaining viable virus (e.g. during win-
ter), at least one PEDV introduction each 21 years could
be expected on average, while according to the upper
limit of the 90 % PI, at least one introduction each
2 years could be expected. Nevertheless, the latter
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output was a rare result since a PIntro ≥ 57.4 % occurred
in only 5 % of the 10,000 iterations we used.
Hence, based on results of scenario II, it must be taken
into account that temperatures and storage time could
vary between SDPP producing countries/seasons. Dee et
al. [29] demonstrated that PEDV can remain viable for
extended periods (e.g. up to 45 and 180 days in stored
complete feed and soya bean meal, respectively), and
that the survival of the virus is ingredient-dependent.
In Europe, the SDPP imported from countries outside
the EU should be stored for at least 6 weeks in dry ware-
house conditions under room temperature [3, 16]. For
EU Member States storage periods have not been de-
fined. The survival of PEDV in a final feed product can
be affected by several parameters such as: temperature,
time and relative humidity. For instance, in a recent
study, Goyal reported that (e.g. at 4 and −20 °C) the
virus could survive up to 4 weeks (last time when the
samples were tested) in slurry and wet feed; and could
cause infection at a very low infectious dose (dilution of
10−8) in experimentally treated pigs [30].
Sampedro et al. suggested that further research should
be carried out to verify and refine the required time and
temperature conditions of storage, particularly in cold
climates [20]. Accordingly, further experimental studies
on the survivability of PEDV at very low temperatures
(e.g. around 0 °C in winter) during different storage pe-
riods (shorter or longer than 6 weeks) would be benefi-
cial to reduce the uncertainty related to our PPlasma
estimates. In the current situation, agreements between
trading partners could be made regarding the best stor-
age periods to use, provided that the minimum require-
ments of the international legislation [3, 15, 16, 18] are
followed.
Regarding the quantity of imported SDPP used in Da-
nish pig herds, a double amount should not pose a high
risk, under the assumption that both the spray-drying
and the storage phases occurred in optimal conditions
(Table 1, scenario III).
The change caused in the PPlasma by increasing the
PInf was relatively high (Table 1, scenario IV), though
the PPlasma remained <1 %. Hence, our most uncertain
parameter had low impact on the results.
Impact of testing raw blood batches as a risk mitigation
measure
SDPP producers should be encouraged to find a way
to substantiate freedom from infection at least in the
herds delivering blood for SDPP. If a highly sensitive
PCR test were applied on every blood batch, then
only test-negative batches could be used to produce
SDPP destined for pig feed. In this way, the PPlasma
could be reduced to very low levels, as we showed
for the situation where SDPP is stored under non-
optimal conditions. By applying raw blood testing and
good SDPP storage, the risk of spreading PEDV be-
tween countries by imported SDPP could become
negligible.
Further risk-mitigating action (s) could consist of
using liquid (e.g. formaldehyde-based) antimicrobials in
feed [29], and/or importing SDPP only from countries
where freedom from PED is substantiated with high con-
fidence (e.g. by testing a sample of blood specimens
from a sufficient number of animals/herds, randomly se-
lected). In such a case, the inputs of herd incidence
(HerdInc) and within-herd prevalence (WHP) used in
this study would be around zero and the probability of
PEDV introduction to Denmark could become negligible
(due to low PContBatch, Eq. 1). Therefore, if in the fu-
ture, PED becomes a notifiable disease in EU, the infec-
tion status of Member States (or herds within Member
States) could be defined with less uncertainty. Conse-
quently, risk assessments at national level would become
more precise because monitoring of outbreaks would in-
crease (more precise HerdInc and WHP inputs would
become available). As suggested by EFSA [3] “additional
sequence data are required to understand PEDV evolu-
tion in Europe and the possible link with PEDV strains
circulating in other parts of the world”. Currently (mid-
2015) PED is not a notifiable disease, and it is consid-
ered questionable whether it is feasible to substantiate
country freedom from disease, as it would require a
costly surveillance program.
Thus, our estimates could be seen as preliminary re-
sults, which can be updated (and can become more pre-
cise) when 1) further knowledge on the epidemiology of
PED becomes available, and/or 2) PED becomes
notifiable.
With the current knowledge we have at hand, we
could not exclude that SDPP produced from a contami-
nated batch of blood could carry viable PEDV. For that
reason we carried out the risk assessment.
Limitations and suggestions for further studies
In this study, as in any risk assessment, some limitations
were present. This was due mainly to the fact that, PED
is a rare disease in the EU and most of the information
we found in literature comes from a few recent studies.
Most of those were carried out during the last decade,
and thus, the current information on the used parame-
ters is scarce. As pointed out by Sampedro et al. [20]
there is paucity of data on the thermal inactivation of
PEDV and there is limited understanding on the mecha-
nisms of the inactivation of viruses during the spray-
drying processes. Hence, in our risk assessment, inputs
were set by taking into account as much as possible the
information we found in previous scientific studies and
uncertainty was included in all inputs.
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Moreover, risk assessment studies can be considered
as progressive processes, which can give important infor-
mation for decision-makers. This information can be
used to prioritize new studies so that uncertainty on the
estimates can be reduced.
For instance, we assumed that the blood was collected
at the abattoir through a closed draining system. If this
is not the case, and if cross-contamination can occur,
then the probability that a batch of plasma contains
PEDV (PContBatch) could be higher than we estimated.
This would be the case when an open blood draining
system is used at the abattoir (blood collected into
buckets or trays). Nevertheless, we assumed that usually,
in EU abattoirs where thousands pigs are slaughtered a
closed system is used, with a hollow knife connected dir-
ectly to the vacuum piping [31]. In countries with en-
demic PED, new studies could be carried out to
investigate the different probabilities of contaminating
the blood batch if an open vs. a closed draining system
is used.
Furthermore, we assumed that if the batch of blood
was contaminated with PEDV, the virus could remain vi-
able in the SDPP after the drying process and the stor-
age, with a probability between 0 % and 1.1 %
(PSurvDryStor in Eq. 2). As explained above, this as-
sumption was based on the simulation output by Sampe-
dro et al. [20]. On the other hand, survival could vary
and could be affected by the different steps of the SDPP
process and by the dryer used, as suggested by EFSA [3].
Testing of pooled blood before spray-drying could be
a solution. At the same time, it must be remarked that
when we investigated the importance of testing raw
blood, we assumed that the sensitivity of such a PCR test
was similar to that reported by Song et al. [32] for test-
ing feces and intestinal samples. The amount of PEDV
RNA detected in serum is usually lower compared to the
levels in feces [33]. Hence, new studies should investi-
gate the sensitivity of the PCR when used on samples of
blood pooled from several thousand animals. Eventual
effects of dilution and interactions between PEDV and
antibodies (eventually present in the batch of blood)
should be studied as well.
Further studies on the relation between prevalence of
animals which shed PEDV in feces and prevalence of
viremic pigs (which have PEDV in blood) would be
beneficial, since updated estimates would become avail-
able for the within-herd prevalence input (WHP in
Eq. 1).
Finally, in our study, we did not consider the possibil-
ity of SDPP cross-contamination after the spray-drying,
e.g. during storage, transport and/or in the farm. We as-
sumed that usually, good manufacturing practices are
followed by producers and good biosecurity measures
are applied by transporters and farmers. Further studies
could investigate the probability of cross-contamination
of SDPP after processing.
Conclusions
The present work gives important information on the
probability of introducing PEDV into the Danish pig
population through the feeding of SDPP to naïve Danish
weaning piglets. The median annual probability of dis-
ease introduction appeared to be very low if the drying
and storage phases were made under strict and efficient
biosecurity measures. However, it appeared that the
probability of introduction could increase dramatically if
the processing is not fully efficient to eliminate the virus
and the SDPP is stored under cold conditions and for a
short time period. That probability could be reduced if
SDPP producers find a way to substantiate freedom from
PEDV at least in the herds delivering blood for produ-
cing SDPP. Alternatively, producers could test raw blood
batches prior to processing. At the same time, producers
should provide documentation that the international le-
gislation, regarding the different phases of SDPP pro-
cessing and storage, has been complied with. Finally, to
reduce uncertainty, further studies could be carried out
on 1) the sensitivity of tests, which can be used on raw
blood batches and 2) the survivability of the PEDV dur-
ing short periods of SDPP storage at very low tempera-
tures (e.g. during winter).
Methods
To assess the annual probability (PPlasma) that at least
one Danish piglet being fed imported, contaminated
SDPP becomes infected with PEDV, we set up and used
a stochastic simulation model. Different variables were
taken into account, according to the diagram reported in
Fig. 1 (representing the SDPP producing layout), and
using the information we found in literature. Fifteen Da-
nish feed producing companies were consulted. They
provided information about the volume and origin of
SDPP imported to Denmark during a 1-year period.
The probability that a matrix (in our case SDPP fed to
naïve piglets) transmits the infection to animals depends
on (1) the probability that the matrix is contaminated
with PEDV and (2) the probability that an exposure to
such a matrix leads to infection in a susceptible pig [3].
Thus, before assessing the PPlasma, we investigated the
probability (PContBatch) that a batch of blood collected
at the abattoir (abroad) is contaminated with PEDV. If
contamination at the abattoir-level is impossible, there is
no need to estimate the PPlasma. Otherwise, the
PPlasma needs to be estimated.
An alternative scenario analysis was subsequently
undertaken, to investigate the impact of the main inputs
on the PPlasma. According to the output of this ana-
lysis, we also investigated the impact of testing for PEDV
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the batch of raw blood collected at the abattoir, as a risk
mitigation measure.
The model was developed in @Risk 6 (Palisade Cor-
poration). Runs were made using 10,000 iterations and
Latin hypercube.
Probability that the batch of blood is contaminated with
PEDV
The probability that a batch of blood is contaminated
with PEDV (at the abattoir-level) was estimated using
the stochastic scenario tree reported in Fig. 2 and Eq. 1:
PContBatch ¼ 1− 1− HerdInc WHP  PnoClinð Þ½ ∧Npigs
ð1Þ
Where, PContBatch represents the probability that at
least one infected animal contributes to the batch of
blood collected during a slaughtering day. In such a case
we assumed that the virus from the individual animal (s)
was homogeneously distributed within the blood vat.
Moreover, we assumed that the blood was usually col-
lected through a closed draining system [3, 31].
HerdInc is the incidence of PEDV infected herds in
the SDPP producing country, and WHP is the within-
herd prevalence in infected herds. Thus, HerdInc repre-
sents the probability that the herd sending pigs for
slaughtering is infected, while WHP is the probability
that the slaughtered pig, from an infected herd, is actu-
ally infected.
PnoClin is the probability that an infected slaughter
animal does not show symptoms (e.g. diarrhea and
vomiting), so that the farmer sends the animal to
slaughter and the ante-mortem inspector allows the
slaughtering.
Npigs is the daily number of slaughtered pigs (in a sin-
gle abattoir abroad), which contribute to a batch of
blood.
Herd incidence in SDPP producing countries from where
pig plasma is imported (HerdInc)
According to a recent report from EFSA [3], the inci-
dence of PEDV infected herds (HerdInc) in EU Member
States is expected to be low.
Based on the information obtained from Danish feed
producing companies and from the Danish Agriculture
& Food Council, SDPP is imported from Spain, Ireland,
United Kingdom, Germany, The Netherlands and
Poland.
Since blood is usually processed soon after collection
at the slaughterhouse, we assumed that the imported
SDPP came from the country, where the pigs were
slaughtered (e.g. if produced in Spain, only Spanish pigs
contributed to a daily batch of blood). Hence, in our
model, HerdInc represented the annual incidence (new
cases) of PEDV infected herds in an EU Member State.
The only well-documented epidemic of PEDV in Europe
(with 63 infected herds) occurred in northern Italy, be-
tween May 2005 and June 2006 [3, 7]. During this time
period, the Italian pig population was composed of ap-
proximately 101,000 pig herds [34].
On the other hand, most of the EU Member States
have no active monitoring on this disease in place, and
consequently underreporting could be present [3].
Therefore, we decided to set HerdInc as Uniform distri-
bution from 0 (no infected herds in the SDPP producing
country), to 63 [3, 7] infected herds out of 101,000 pig
herds present in Italy [34] during a 1-year period. To in-
clude in the HerdInc the uncertainty due to eventual
Fig. 2 Stochastic scenario tree to assess the probability (PContBatch) that at least one slaughtered pig is infected. Herdinc = incidence of infected herds
abroad, WHP =within-herd prevalence, PnoClin = probability that the infected pig is slaughtered since it does not show symptoms of infection before
slaughter at ante-mortem inspection. The latter is given by 1 – PClin, where PClin represents the probability that the infected pig shows symptoms
(e.g. watery diarrhea) and so it is not slaughtered for human consumption
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under-reporting and lack of knowledge, we set the max-
imum value as a Beta distribution (s + 1; n-s + 1), where s
is the annual number of infected herds found in Italy (63
in our case) and n is the overall number of herds present
in the same country (101,000).
Within-herd prevalence (WHP)
The prevalence of infected animals within finishers
and/or sows herds (WHP) was set according to find-
ings from Pijpers et al. [23]. To represent the vari-
ation in the within-herd prevalence, we set WHP with
a Pert distribution (RiskPert) ranging from 46 to
100 % and with mode equal to the median of the
values (Table 2) reported by Pijpers et al. [23]. Often
suckling pigs, pregnant sows, 3 to 10 week-old piglets
and fattening pigs are housed in separate facilities
[23]. Accordingly, we assumed that the proportion of
animals shedding virus (in feces) within each animal
group, could represent the WHP in different kind of
pig herds. Moreover, from Pijpers et al. [23], we only
used data on prevalence of infected animals, older
than 10 weeks (Table, 2), since usually those are sent
to slaughter where blood is collected for producing
SDPP.
To date, very few studies investigated viremia in PEDV
infected pigs. In Pijpers et al. [23], animals were tested
for PEDV presence in feces. We assumed that the pro-
portion of animals shedding PEDV in feces (in each age
group) corresponded to the within-herd prevalence of
viremic animals (with PEDV in serum).
It is usually assumed that viremia can last for short pe-
riods. Gerber et al. [13] did not detect PEDV in plasma
of infected pigs at peak of disease. On the other hand,
our assumption is supported by other studies. In fact,
Hesse et al. [21] detected viremia in infected pigs and
suggested that there should be a correlation between
viremia and virus shedding (either fecal or nasal), while
Jung et al. [33] reported that severe diarrhea, vomiting
and fecal shedding may be accompanied by viremia. The
latter authors detected viral RNA in serum of infected
pigs, with titers between 4.8 and 7.6 log10 GE/mL.
Variables for slaughtered pigs contributing to a batch of
blood (PnoClin and Npigs)
We assumed that in a naive pig population (as should be
the case in most European pig populations) fatteners
and adults can show a morbidity of up 90–100 %, with
the typical clinical signs of PED such as watery diarrhea
[3, 9]. We set the probability that an adult infected pig
shows symptoms as PClin = RiskUniform (90 %; 100 %),
while the probability of not showing symptoms (in
Eq. 1) was PnoClin = 1- PClin.
Moreover, a batch of blood, which can be used to
produce SDPP, is usually composed of blood pooled
from 6,000 to 10,000 pigs slaughtered on the same
day [13]. In our model, we set this information as a
uniform distribution where Npigs = RiskUniform
(6,000; 10,000).
If complete virus removal is not possible, can a piglet
become infected by being exposed to a SDPP
contaminated ration?
According to Opriessnig et al., RNA of PEDV could be
found in traces in commercial SDPP, but it should not
cause infection in animals [14]. In contrast, Pasick et al.
argued that contaminated SDPP could cause PED out-
breaks [11]. Those authors reported that in January
2014, the first PED case in Canada was confirmed in a
swine herd in south-western Ontario. Several lots of feed
and SDPP imported from the USA tested positive for
PEDV by RT-PCR. Accordingly, it was suspected that
the contaminated feed/SDPP may have caused PEDV
introduction into Canada. Three of the PEDV-positive
SDPP samples were orally inoculated to 12 (3-week-old)
piglets confined in the same barn. All the animals be-
came infected (with positive rectal swabs), suggesting
that at least one of the contaminated SDPP samples con-
tained viable PEDV. Sampedro et al. estimated by a
simulation study that PEDV could remain viable in proc-
essed positive blood batches [20].
Thus, currently, there is debate around the world, on
the viability of PEDV eventually present in processed
(spray-dried) contaminated plasma. It is in fact argued
Table 2 Inputs used for the within-herd prevalence of viremic animals (WHP), based on Pijpers et al. [23]
Animal group Proportion of infected animals between those tested per group
Pregnant sowsa 4/6 = 67 %
Farrowing sowsa 2/3 = 67 %
Fattening pigsa 6/6 = 100 %
Pregnant sowsb 7/8 = 88 %
Fatttening pigsb 6/13 = 46 %
WHP distribution RiskPert (46 %; mode =median of all values; 100 %)
aAnimals tested during the first month of the outbreak
bAnimals tested during the 10 months following the beginning of the outbreak
N.B. According to Pijpers et al. [23], we used the proportion of animals shedding PEDV in feces within groups of pigs older than 10 weeks, since only those
animals were assumed to contribute to the blood batch collected at the abattoir
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that RNA could be present in a ration of SDPP, but such
a low amount of virus should not be able to cause dis-
ease in the animal (e.g. the virus or parts of it are
present, but it has been killed by the spray-drying
process and/or by the storage time) [13, 14].
For these reasons, to take into account for the differ-
ent points of view we found in the most recent literature
[3, 11, 13, 14, 17, 20], we set the probability that a wean-
ing piglet becomes infected by receiving a contaminated
ration of SDPP as PInf = RiskUniform [0; RiskBeta (1 + 1;
1,000,000-1 + 1] within Eqs. 2–3 (below). Therefore, here
“contaminated” means that viable PEDV could be
present in traces, and we assumed uncertainty on the
probability that such a virus could cause infection (this
uncertainty is represented in the PInf range). In PInf the
minimum represents the situation where it is impossible
that the piglet becomes infected (since all virus is non-
viable), while the maximum represents a negligible indi-
vidual risk of infection by consumption of a SDPP ration
contaminated with low levels of viable virus. For the
maximum, a Beta distribution was used to represent
uncertainty.
Probability of PEDV introduction into Danish pig herds
The annual probability (PPlasma) that at least one Da-
nish piglet becomes infected with PEDV due to
imported contaminated SDPP was estimated as:
PPlasma ¼ 1− 1− PContBatch  PSurvDryStor  PInfð Þ½ ∧Rations
ð2Þ
PSurvDryStor was the probability that PEDV present
in the contaminated raw batch of blood survived to both
the spray-drying process and the storage period. We set
this input according to the information from Sampedro
et al. [20]. The latter authors carried out a risk assess-
ment and simulated that between 0 and 1.1 % (worst
case scenario) of the positive raw blood batches could
remain positive with viable PEDV, after the drying
process and storage at 20, 22 °C for 2 weeks. Hence in
our model, we set PSurvDryStor = RiskUniform (0 %;
1.1 %).
Moreover, we assumed that if a batch of SDPP was still
contaminated with viable PEDV, all the derived rations
of SDPP were contaminated homogeneously with PEDV
present in traces.
The term Rations in Eq. 2 is the number of SDPP ra-
tions used in Denmark during a 1-year period. Annually,
250 t of SDPP are imported to Denmark (unpublished
data from the Danish feed companies). The amount of
SDPP used in a ration of feed for a weaning piglet,
ranges between 4 and 5 % corresponding to approxi-
mately 15–20 g of SDPP per piglet per day. Hence, we
set Rations = 250,000,000 g / RiskUniform (15; 20) g ~
14.3 million rations used per year.
Alternative scenario analysis
In this section we carried out an alternative scenario
analysis (what-if analysis) to assess the PPlasma under
circumstances different from those assumed in the pre-
vious sections.
For that purpose, we compared the PPlasma estimated
with the reference simulation scenario described above
(Table 1, Scenario I) with other scenarios obtained by a)
setting the probability of PEDV survival during the SDPP
storage equal to 100 % (Table 1, Scenario II), b) doubling
the annual number of SDPP imported rations (Table 1,
Scenario III), and c) doubling the probability that a sus-
ceptible Danish naïve piglet fed with SDPP contaminated
with PEDV becomes infected (Table 1, Scenario IV).
We investigated scenarios from II to IV for different
purposes. For instance, in the reference scenario (Table 1,
I), PSurvDryStor was set according to simulation esti-
mates from Sampedro et al. [20], who assumed SDPP
storage at high temperatures for a few weeks. PEDV is
known to be more resistant in cold and wet conditions
than at high temperatures [3, 17, 19, 30]. Hence, in sce-
nario II we used the conservative assumption that a
short storage period (e.g. of 2 weeks) with low tempera-
tures (e.g. during winter) is not completely efficient to
inactivate all viable virus, which has eventually survived
to the spray-drying process. Additionally, as in Sampe-
dro et al. [20] we assumed that the virus surviving the
spray-drying can be infectious. Thus, in scenario II, only
the spray-drying phase was considered as a potential
PEDV inactivation step and we set the probability that
the virus survived such a step as PSurvDry = RiskUni-
form [(0; RiskUniform (5.5 %; 60 %)]. The distribution
used for the maximum limit was still taken from Sampe-
dro et al., who estimated that up to 5.5–60 % of the
positive raw blood batches could remain positive with vi-
able virus after the spray–drying [20]. Still, we assumed
that the remaining PEDV was homogeneously present in
all the SDPP rations derived from a contaminated blood
batch.
With scenario III, we investigated the impact of an
eventual increase in the annual number of imported
SDPP rations (used in Danish pig herds).
With scenario IV, we investigated the impact of using
a maximum limit for PInf higher than negligible (max-
imum > 1/1,000,000).
Impact of testing raw blood batches with PCR, as a risk
mitigation measure
In the alternative scenario analysis we found that if
SDPP is contaminated with PEDV and storage does not
allow complete elimination of all remaining viable virus,
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there could be a remarkable increase in the PPlasma
(Table 1, Scenario II).
The investigation of critical control points in the SDPP
producing layout was out of the scope of this article.
Nevertheless, under a situation of inefficient storage, we
investigated the opportunity of testing the raw batch of
blood as a risk mitigation measure.
For this purpose, a single PCR testing could be carried
out on the blood pooled from several thousand pigs
(Npigs in Eq. 1) slaughtered in a day. As an example, we
considered a PCR with sensitivity (Se) similar to that re-
ported by Song et al. [32], for testing fecal and intestinal
samples (Se = 92.9 %). If the batch of blood is negative,
then PInfBatch should be around zero. As a conse-
quence, also PPlasma could become very low (according
to Eq. 3). In contrast, if the virus is detected at this stage,
the batch of blood could be destined to other purposes
or for other animal species.
Therefore to assess the impact of testing raw blood
batches we estimated PPlasma by:
PPlasma ¼ 1− 1− PContBatch  PFalseNegBatch  PSurvDry  PInfð Þ½ ∧Rations
ð3Þ
Where, PSurvDry replaced PSurvDryStor used in Eq. 2
(as in Table 1, Scenario II). Moreover we introduced the
input PFalseNegBatch, which represented the probability
that a batch of blood containing viable PEDV, from at
least one infected animal (out of the Npigs slaughtered
daily) is classified as false negative by the PCR used.
Thus, PFalseNegBatch was given by 100 – Se.
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